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however, insist on privity. 9 A recovery on the ground of negligence
would have been more difficult here 10 than in other states," and to
bring himself under the statute,' 2 plaintiff would have had to prove
that the deleterious substance had been added, 13 whereas it developed
after the can had been sealed. While not going so far as to invoke
so broad a third party beneficiary rule as in Lawrence v. Fox,1 4 it is

submitted that the close relationship of the plaintiff to the injured
party in the instant case might, without departing radically from
established legal precedent, or opening the door to extensive litigation,
form a basis of recovery.
J. R. O'D.
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TRADE ASSOCIATION.-Plaintiff, a civil engineer, furnished, according to submitted building plans and specifications, estimates of
iron and wire to metal fabricators of whom thirty-two are members
of a voluntary, unincorporated association. Plaintiff's service enabled smaller and irresponsible concerns to bid and this, the parties
appear to agree, was ruinous to the trade. The association adopted
a resolution requiring its members to make their own estimates on
bids for metal work used in construction and enforced it by censure,
fines and expulsion. From an award of the Supreme Court granting
plaintiff damages and injunctive relief both sides appeal, held, reversed and complaint dismissed. The association acting in good
faith for the benefit and advantage of its members and in the best
interests of the trade was within its rights although plaintiff's business was damaged by the resolution and its enforcement. Arnold v.
Burgess, 241 App. Div. 364, 272 N. Y. Supp. 534 (lst Dept. 1934).
Persons affiliating themselves with a voluntary association thereby
agree to abide by its constitution and by-laws since the latter are the
terms of the contract which define the privileges secured and the
duties assumed by those who become members.' At common law
244, n. 47.
1934) §175, p. 201. In Sheppard v.
Beck Bros., Inc., 131 Misc. 164, 225 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1927) it was held that
the mere presence of a tack in the food did not give rise to a res ipsa loquitur
'1

SALES (2d ed. 1924)
LAW OF SALES (2d ed.

WILLISTON,

"WHITNEY,

case.

'Cases cited in supra note 7, in which the court said that an implied
warranty ran to the sub-vendee to establish a duty, the breach of which
afforded a cause of action.
"N. Y. AGRICULTURE AND MARxETS LAW (1925) c. 612, subd. 8.
"Instant case.
"20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
'Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931); see Rankin v.
Probey, 131 App. Div. 328, 331, 115 N. Y. Supp. 832 (3d Dept. 1909):

RECENT DECISIONS
"the voluntary adoption by an association of employees of reasonable
rules relating to persons for whom, and to conditions under which,
its members shall work is not illegal." 2 Nor is the enforcement of
such rules through fines and expulsion illegal.3 In this regard, there
is no distinction between the rights of organized employees and the
trade organization. 4 A voluntary association is not to be condemned
as being in undue restraint of trade because it may affect a change
in market conditions, which change would be in mitigation of recognized evils and which would not impair but rather would foster
fair competitive opportunities. 5 Even though the enforcement of
"* * * rights of members with the association and among themselves are
governed by their agreement which is contained in the constitution and
by-laws"; Fairchild v. Tillotson, 118 Misc. 639, 640, 195 N. Y. Supp. 39, 40
(1922) : "a person joining any legally organized body with powers to make
rules and laws for its own government and for the regulation of the conduct
of its members becomes bound by those laws and rules and a decision of that
body proceeding according to judicial forms and touching his rights or
relation as a member is binding on the courts"; Shapiro v. Gehlman, 152 Misc.
13, 272 N. Y. Supp. 624 (1934).
SBossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 358, 117 N. E. 582, 585 (1917).
'Id. at 359; Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 282, 177 N. E. 833, 834
(1931): "* * * if the contract reasonably provides that the performance of
certain acts will constitute a sufficient cause for the expulsion of a member
and the charges of their performance with notice to the member shall be tried
before a tribunal set up by the association, the provision is exclusive and the
judgment of the tribunal rendered after a fair trial will not be reviewed by
the regularly constituted courts"; cf. Carey v. Int'l Brotherhood of Paper
Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 687, 206 N. Y. Supp. 73, 83 (1924): "Until their
[constitution's and by-law's] provisions are violated there is no ground upon
which to invoke the jurisdiction of the court."
'Lafond v. Deems, 81 N. Y. 507, 514 (1880): "Courts should not as a
general rule interfere with the contentions and quarrels of voluntary associations so long as the government is fairly and honestly administered"; Levy v.
U. S. Grand Lodge, 1. S. 0. B., 9 Misc. 633, 635, 30 N. Y. Supp. 885, 886
(1894). In all questions of policy, discipline and internal government, the
decision of the voluntary association in the absence of bad faith should govern.
A policy of a voluntary association not illegal nor derogatory of a member's
property rights is not subject to regulation. See Allee v. Jones, 68 Misc. 141,
142, 123 N. Y. Supp. 581, 583 (1910).
See Appalachian Coal Co., Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 374,
53 Sup. Ct. 471 (1933): "Putting an end to injurious practices and the
consequent improvement of the competitive position of a group of producers is
not the less worthy aim and may be entirely consonant with the public interest,
where the group must still meet effective competition in a fair market and
neither seeks nor is able to effect a domination of prices"; cf. Bossert v. Dhuy,
221 N. Y. 342, 355, 117 N. E. 582, 584 (1917), where the court in speaking
of a labor organization states: "Workingmen may organize for the purpose
deemed beneficial to themselves and in that organizational capacity may determine that their members shall not work with non-members upon specified
work or kinds of work. An act when done maliciously and for an illegal
purpose may be restrained, and held to be within the bounds of reasonable
business competition when done in good faith and for a legal purpose." Thus
if the defendant's enforcement of its policy does not include fraud, coercion
or malice it is legal. Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931)
(Defendant went beyond the bounds of lawful conduct in carrying on its
campaign against the plaintiff and the court decided for the plaintiff not on
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lawful harm as to the
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destroy the plaintiff's
no action will lie.

detrimental to another
latter. 6 The defendant
court as conspiring to
business; there was no

in his business it is a
was unjustifiedly conlimit competition and
wrong committed and

A. S.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY OF GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO EMPLOYEE OF SUBCONTRACTOR.-Claimant, employee of

subcontractor under defendant general contractor, was injured in the
course of employment. The subcontractor had insured for benefit of
employees with a foreign carrier authorized by the State Industrial
Commission. The insurer became insolvent subsequent to date of
claimant's injuries and claimant seeks to hold defendant. Held, defendant is not liable for unpaid compensation, as the subcontractor
had duly provided for compensation. Sciachitano v. Spencer-Forbes,
Inc., 264 N. Y. 324, 190 N. E. 656 (1934).
Under Section 56 of the Workmen's Compensation Law,' where
a general contractor sublets an undertaking involving a hazardous
employment 2 he is liable for injuries 3 to employees 4 of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor has procured compensation as
provided in Section 50.5 Section 56 also provides that when a general contractor has paid compensation to an employee of an uninsured
the ground that the defendant's criticism was wrong but that it was clearly so
wrong that only malevolence or something close akin thereto could have
supplied the motive power); Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 232 App.
Div. 591, 594, 251 N. Y. Supp. 153, 157 (1st Dept. 1931): "For a business
man wantonly or maliciously, without provocation, to interfere with another
person's business by preventing the third party from entering into a contract
with such other persons constitutes unfair competition where there is reasonable
certainty that the contract would otherwise have been made."
'Appalachian Coal Co., Inc. v. United States, supra note 5; cf. Bossert
v. Dhuy, supra note 2, 221 N. Y. at 359, 117 N. E. at 585: "If the determination is reached in good faith for the purpose of bettering the condition of its
members and not through malice or otherwise attempting to injure an employer,
the fact that such action may result in incidental injury to the employer does
not constitute a justification for issuing an injunction against enforcing such
action."
1 Laws of 1922, c. 615.
N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1922) §3.
IN. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1914) §2, subd. 7.
'N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1922) §2, subd. 4.
'N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW as amended by Laws of 1922,
2

c. 619.

